Generalizing attentional control across dimensions and tasks: evidence from transfer of proportion-congruent effects

Three experiments investigated transfer of list-wide proportion congruent (LWPC) effects from a set of congruent and incongruent items with different frequency (inducer task) to a set of congruent and incongruent items with equal frequency (diagnostic task). Experiments 1 and 2 mixed items from horizontal and vertical Simon tasks. Tasks always involved different stimuli that varied on the same dimension (colour) in Experiment 1 and on different dimensions (colour, shape) in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 mixed trials from a manual Simon task with trials from a vocal Stroop task, with colour being the relevant stimulus in both tasks. There were two major results. First, we observed transfer of LWPC effects in Experiments 1 and 3, when tasks shared the relevant dimension, but not in Experiment 2. Second, sequential modulations of congruency effects transferred in Experiment 1 only. Hence, the different transfer patterns suggest that LWPC effects and sequential modulations arise from different mechanisms. Moreover, the observation of transfer supports an account of LWPC effects in terms of list-wide cognitive control, while being at odds with accounts in terms of stimulus–response (contingency) learning and item-specific control

Punishment sensitivity predicts the impact of punishment on cognitive control

Cognitive control theories predict enhanced conflict adaptation after punishment. However, no such effect was found in previous work. In the present study, we demonstrate in a flanker task how behavioural adjustments following punishment signals are highly dependent on punishment sensitivity (as measured by the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) scale): Whereas low punishment-sensitive participants do show increased conflict adaptation after punishment, high punishment-sensitive participants show no such modulation. Interestingly, participants with a high punishment-sensitivity showed an overall reaction time increase after punishments. Our results stress the role of individual differences in explaining motivational modulations of cognitive control

Is conflict adaptation an illusion?

Conflict adaptation theory is one of the most popular theories in cognitive psychology. The theory argues that participants strategically modulate attention away from distracting stimulus features in response to conflict. Although results with proportion congruent, sequential congruency, and similar paradigms seem consistent with the conflict adaptation view, some researchers have expressed scepticism. The paradigms used in the study of conflict adaptation require the manipulation of stimulus frequencies, sequential dependencies, time-on-task regularities, and various other task regularities that introduce the potential for learning of conflict-unrelated information. This results in the unintentional confounding of measures of conflict adaptation with simpler learning and memory biases. There are also alternative accounts which propose that attentional adaptation does occur, but via different mechanisms, such as valence, expectancy, or effort. A significant (and often heated) debate remains surrounding the question of whether conflict adaptation exists independent of these alternative mechanisms of action. The aim of this Research Topic is to provide a forum for current directions in this area, considering perspectives from all sides of the debate

Early and late indications of item-specific control in a Stroop mouse tracking study

Published: May 17, 2018Previous studies indicated that cognitive conflict continues to bias actions even after a movement has been initiated. The present paper examined whether cognitive control also biases actions after movement initiation. To this end, we had participants perform a Stroop task in which we manipulated the item-specific proportion of (in)congruent trials (80% congruent vs. 20% congruent). Importantly, participants responded via mouse movements, allowing us to evaluate various movement parameters: initiation times, movement times, and movement accuracy. Results showed that mouse movements were faster and more accurate during congruent trials compared to incongruent trials. Moreover, we observed that this congruency effect was larger for 80% congruent compared to 20% congruent items, which reflects itemspecific cognitive control. Notably, when responses were initiated very fast ± rendering virtually no time for stimulus processing before movement onset ± this item-specific control was observed only in movement times. However, for relatively slow initiated responses, item specific control was observed both in initiation and in movement times. These findings demonstrate that item-specific cognitive control biases actions before and after movement initiation.This work was supported by the Special Research Fund of Ghent University (BOF) (grant number: BOF13/24j/080). MFLR was supported in part by the Research Foundation ± Flanders (FWO) as a Pegasus Marie Curie Fellow (grant number: 1262214N) and by a BOF postdoctoral fellowship (grant number: BOF15/PDO/135). ELA was supported by the FWO (grant number: 12C4715N)

The congruency sequence effect 3.0: a critical test of conflict adaptation

Over the last two decades, the congruency sequence effect (CSE) -the finding of a reduced congruency effect following incongruent trials in conflict tasks- has played a central role in advancing research on cognitive control. According to the influential conflict-monitoring account, the CSE reflects adjustments in selective attention that enhance task focus when needed, often termed conflict adaptation. However, this dominant interpretation of the CSE has been called into question by several alternative accounts that stress the role of episodic memory processes: feature binding and (stimulus-response) contingency learning. To evaluate the notion of conflict adaptation in accounting for the CSE, we construed versions of three widely used experimental paradigms (the colour-word Stroop, picture-word Stroop and flanker task) that effectively control for feature binding and contingency learning. Results revealed that a CSE can emerge in all three tasks. This strongly suggests a contribution of attentional control to the CSE and highlights the potential of these unprecedentedly clean paradigms for further examining cognitive control

It wasn't me! Motor activation from irrelevant spatial information in the absence of a response

Embodied cognition postulates that perceptual and motor processes serve higher-order cognitive faculties like language. A major challenge for embodied cognition concerns the grounding of abstract concepts. Here we zoom in on abstract spatial concepts and ask the question to what extent the sensorimotor system is involved in processing these. Most of the empirical support in favor of an embodied perspective on (abstract) spatial information has derived from so-called compatibility effects in which a task-irrelevant feature either facilitates (for compatible trials) or hinders (in incompatible trials) responding to the task-relevant feature. This type of effect has been interpreted in terms of (task-irrelevant) feature-induced response activation. The problem with such approach is that incompatible features generate an array of task relevant and irrelevant activations [e.g., in primary motor cortex (M1)], and lateral hemispheric interactions render it difficult to assign credit to the task-irrelevant feature per se in driving these activations. Here, we aim to obtain a cleaner indication of response activation on the basis of abstract spatial information. We employed transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to probe response activation of effectors in response to semantic, task-irrelevant stimuli (i.e., the words left and right) that did not require an overt response. Results revealed larger motor evoked potentials (MEPs) for the right (left) index finger when the word right (left) was presented. Our findings provide support for the grounding of abstract spatial concepts in the sensorimotor system

Cognitive and affective theory of mind in healthy aging

Background Previous studies on the effect of healthy aging on Theory of Mind (ToM) have produced mixed results. A possible explanation may be that different ToM components and types of inference have not systematically been considered. This study examined the effect of aging on ToM by assessing both first and second order cognitive and affective components within a single task. Methods We compared performance of young (M= 18.3y) and older adults (M= 61.0y) on the Yoni task. This task allows for a within-subject assessment of both first and second order cognitive and affective ToM. Results We observed that older adults had longer reaction times than young adults across cognitive and affective first order items. For second order items, this age difference was larger for affective than cognitive items. Results showed no indications that these findings could be explained by age differences in speed/accuracy trade-offs. Conclusion Our findings suggest that decision processes underlying ToM are slower in older adults on both first and second order inferences, but that age differences in these processes between cognitive and affective ToM are selective to second order inferences. We propose that the observed age differences may be associated with cortical and mental changes that occur with aging